Unemployment risk and wage differentials by Pinheiro, Roberto & Visschers, Ludo
 
 
Working Paper 12-09  Departamento de Economía 
Economic Series Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
January, 2012     Calle Madrid, 126 
 28903 Getafe (Spain) 
   Fax (34) 916249875 
 
 
Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials* 
 
ROBERTO PINHEIRO† AND LUDO VISSCHERS‡ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure 
jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in 
equilibrium when all workers are identical, and firms differ, but do so only in offered job security 
(the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search 
on and off the job, wages paid increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the 
distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. As a result, unemployment spells become persistent 
for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’, that is 
created entirely by firm heterogeneity alone. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take 
wage cuts to move to more stable employment. 
 
 
Keywords: Layoff Rates, Unemployment risk, Wage Differentials, Unemployment Scarring 
JEL Codes : J31, J63 
                                                          
* We are grateful to numerous colleagues for insightful comments, and to Robert Kirkby for excellent research assistance. We also benefitted from the 
feedback of several seminar audiences. The comments of 2 anonymous referees and the editor helped us improve this paper greatly. Naturally, all remaining 
errors are our own. Visschers acknowledges the support of Simon Fraser University’s President’s Research Gr ant, UC3M’s Instituto de Economí a; the Spanish 
Ministry of Science and Innovation, Grant 2011/00049/001, a grant from the Bank of Spain’s Programa de Investigación de Excelencia, and the Juan de la 
Cierva Fellowship. This paper was written in part while the second author was at Simon Fraser University. 
† University of Colorado, Roberto(dot)Pinheiro(at)colorado(dot)edu. 
‡ Department of Economics, U. Carlos III Madrid, lvissche(at)eco(dot)uc3m(dot)es 
1 Introduction
When a transition into unemployment inflicts a loss on the worker, a competitive labor market requires a higher
risk of unemployment to be compensated by a higher wage. However, empirically, at the firm level the relation
between job security - the probability of not becoming unemployed - and wages, seems to be positive or at the
least not significantly different from zero.1 For example, after controlling for worker and firm characteristics
including firm profit levels and firm exit probabilities, Mayo and Murray (1991), and Arai and Heyman (2001)
find a positive correlation between job security and wages.2
The lack of compensating wages is even more puzzling, once it is observed that transitions to unemploy-
ment also raise the prospect of shortened employment spells in the future. A job loss increases the probability
of future job losses (e.g. Stevens 1997, Kletzer 1998). Such a reduction in subsequent employment durations
is responsible for a significant part of the cost of a transition into unemployment (Eliason and Storrie 2006,
Böheim and Taylor 2002, Arulampalam et al. 2000). For displaced workers of a given quality, commonly, new
jobs come with lower wages, and simultaneously with a higher risk of renewed unemployment (Cappellari and
Jenkins 2008, Uhlendorf 2006, Stewart 2007). These observations are in line with the absence of compensating
wage differentials at the firm level.
In addition, job security is partially related to observable and unobservable characteristics of the firms
offering such positions. For example, larger firms tend to offer more secure jobs ( Morrissette 2004, Winter-
Ebmer 1995, 2001). Escape from a sequence of low-pay and no-pay spells can occur when the same worker
is lucky enough to land a high-wage job (Stewart 2007). In regression analyses of linked employer-employee
data Holzer, Lane and Vilhuber (2004) and Andersson, Holzer and Lane (2005) find that this higher-wage,
more stable, employment appears to be concentrated in a subset of ‘good’ firms, i.e. firms with a high firm
fixed effect. These firms are typically also larger.
We propose an equilibrium theory that is consistent with (i) the lack of compensating wage differentials,
(ii) a pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ through both repeated unemployment spells and lower wages, and
(iii) the suggested importance of firm heterogeneity in shaping these. In our model, we follow Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), henceforth referred to as BM, and introduce search frictions and on-the-job search into an
otherwise competitive setting. Our sole deviation from the BM setup, is that firms differ in the job security they
provide, and not, for example, in the productivity of their workers. In this framework, even though workers
ask for a risk premium to stay at a risky job, fully compensating wage differentials are not offered in the labor
market equilibrium. Because of a shorter expected match duration, and a higher cost of offering the worker the
same life-time utility value, firms that offer only low job security have no incentive to compete with more solid
firms to keep workers for the long term. It then follows that workers move only from firms that offer risky jobs
1The literature testing for the relationship between job security at the firm level and wages is remarkably small. We know more
about compensation for risk at different levels: for example, at the industry level the picture of compensating wage differentials is
ambiguous, with some evidence in favor of it (Abowd and Aschenfelter 1981 e.g.). Moretti (2000) found evidence that seasonal work
earns a premium versus year-around work. However, patterns at industry level are not necessarily informative about what occurs at
the firm level. In this paper, we argue that search frictions, working between firms and workers within e.g. industries and occupations,
can result in interesting non-linearities and interactions for the wage - unemployment risk relationship.
2When firm profit levels or firm exit probabilities are not controlled for, this relationship becomes even stronger, as wages and firm
failure probabilities are also negatively correlated, see for example Blanchflower (1991) and Carneiro and Portugal (2006)
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to firms that offer safe jobs. The model then naturally produces an aggregate hazard rate for transitions into
unemployment declining with time, whereas in the BM model the rate is counterfactually constant.
The value of more job security is low in jobs where the lifetime expected utility is only slightly higher than
the value of unemployment. As a result, in these jobs, not only do the expected values of employment increase
in job security, but the actual wages themselves increase in job security – a strong failure of compensating
differentials. This comes about because at the bottom of the wage distribution, even with different levels of
job security, different types of firms are still in considerable wage competition with each other.3 We are able
to show that the increasing relationship between job security and wages extends at least to the entire ‘risky’
tail of the firm distribution (i.e. the tail of the distribution with those firms that offer the lowest job security).
On the other hand, higher up in the equilibrium wage distribution, workers value job security more, and
could accept wage cuts to move to safer firms, and thus the model is consistent with wage cuts in job-to-job
transitions, documented for example by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). We show that the extent to which this
happens depends also on the degree of competition on the firms’ side of the market: loosely, wage cuts can
occur if, increasing with job security, there is a decreasing amount of firms with a similar extent of job security
competing for the same workers.4
By themselves, the apparent lack of compensating differentials and unemployment scarring can also be
explained by worker heterogeneity and learning about match quality as well. It is possible to distinguish our
mechanism from those alternatives by looking at further implications of these theories. We discuss this in detail
in the last section. These different implications could then naturally be used to measure how much worker,
match, and firm heterogeneity each contribute to the risk of job loss. At this stage, it’s worth reiterating that
many of the empirical papers mentioned above have attempted to control for worker heterogeneity, and still
found significant scarring effects, suggesting a significant role for alternative mechanisms.
In short, our model is an equilibrium model of the wage ladder, where, endogenously, the lowest rungs
of the wage ladder are especially slippery. It can explain the lack of compensating differentials, ‘genuine’
unemployment scarring, and the correlation with firm identities and characteristics. The model also produces
a negative correlation between firm size and unemployment risk that operates through the same channel as
in the BM model. The literature has hitherto largely ignored the effects of heterogeneity in the firm-specific
component of job security by itself (and not related to imminent plant closures) in shaping patterns of low
future wages and repeated job loss for those currently unemployed.5 If firm heterogeneity is a leading factor
behind these patterns, there are also clear policy implications. First, as it creates persistence in bad labor mar-
3Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) study a labor market with on-the-job search where firms pay wages and provide job amenities.
In their model the valuation of the amenity is constant and given, in our model the valuation of job security depends endogenously on
the firm’s wage and the entire wage distribution. Job security also differs because it is strongly complementary with wages: the lowest
wages will necessarily be at the riskiest firms, independently of, e.g., the firm distribution.
4In the most straightforward case, where a finite number of types exist, and hence, some firms do not face competition from very
similar types on the upside and downside, wage cuts will occur, independently of parameter values, as shown in Pinheiro and Visschers
2009.
5Some have argued that heterogeneity on both sides of the market, with low-quality, unstable workers sorting into unstable firms,
can explain the lack of compensating differentials (Evans and Leighton 1989, for example). These arguments seem to imply that
worker heterogeneity is still a necessary condition to create patterns of wages increasing in job security. This paper argues, on the
contrary, that firm heterogeneity alone can generate these patterns.
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ket outcomes, it would likely increase the inferred risk that a typical worker faces in the labor market. Then,
incorporating that the first rungs of the wage ladder are more slippery has further implications for the consump-
tion/savings tradeoff of workers who have just become unemployed, and, ex ante, for employed workers who
face differing risks of becoming unemployed, with more dire consequences if they do fall off the job ladder,
into unemployment.6 Secondly, it could mean that policies attempting to diminish the heterogeneity, both in
workers’ initial conditions, for example by investing in education, and the conditions later in life, to make up
for perceived human capital loss while unemployed, might not be as effective as has sometimes been assumed.
From a negative correlation between wages and job insecurity, and more importantly, a perceived joint cause
of both of these on the worker’s side, it is tempting to conclude that increasing a worker’s earnings capacity
would also increase his or her job security in subsequent jobs. However, this gain in job security might not be
realized when its cause lies not with the worker, but –without being affected by worker-centered policies– on
the firm’s side.
2 Model
A measure 1 of risk-neutral firms and a measure m of risk-neutral workers live forever, and discount the future
at rate r. All firms produce an identical amount of output p per worker, but differ in the probability δ with
which they send workers back into unemployment. We index firms by this probability, and will refer to a
high-δ firm as a “risky firm”, and a low-δ firm as a “solid firm”. The distribution function of firm types is
H(δ); this distribution can contain mass points. Apart from the differences in layoff risk δ, the setup further
follows Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The labor market is subject to search frictions: unemployed workers
receive a single job offer at rate λ0, employed workers at rate λ1. This offer can be accepted or rejected on the
spot, no recall of a rejected offer is possible. An offer is a wage w to be paid by the firm as long as the match
lasts; unemployed workers receive b each period they are without a job. Firms are committed to the posted
wage, which has to be the same for every worker in the firm, and are able to hire everyone who accepts their
offer. They maximize steady state profits.
2.1 Worker’s Problem and Risk-Equivalent Wages
Consider that firms with layoff risk δ post according to a symmetric, possibly pure, strategy with cdf Fˆ (w|δ).
We can express the value functions of workers as follows: for unemployed workers
rV0 = b+ λ0
∫ ∫
max{V (w, δ)− V0, 0}dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ). (1)
Similarly, for employed workers
rV (w, δ) = w + λ1
∫ ∫
max{V (w′, δ′)− V (w, δ), 0}dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′) + δ(V0 − V (w, δ)) (2)
6See Lise (2011) for a model linking the climbs of the wage ladder through on-the-job search, and the drops from the wage ladder,
to consumption and savings decisions. In his model, following BM, the risk of dropping from the ladder is constant across workers
and jobs.
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The optimal policy is a reservation value policy, and by the monotonicity of value function (2) in w while
keeping δ fixed, and vice versa, it follows that, given a current (w, δ) there is a reservation wage function
w′ = wr(δ′;w, δ) such that each (w′, δ′) yields a lifetime expected value equal to the value of employment
at wage w in a firm with layoff probability δ. This function can be derived directly from the above equations,
given that V (wr(δ′;w, δ), δ′) = V (w, δ). When taking the wage at the most solid firm as the reference wage,
we can define
w∗(ws, δ) def= wr(δ, ws, δ) = ws + (δ − δ)(V (ws, δ)− V0), (3)
which implies that the difference between a wage at a firm with unemployment risk δ and the equally preferred
wage at the most solid firm δ is precisely the per-period expected loss due to decreased job security in the
more risky firm. In case of this indifference, we refer to the latter as solid-firm equivalent wage. Below, to
distinguish solid-firm equivalent wages from actual wages paid, we superscript the former, ws, while star the
latter, w∗, when necessary.
We can find the function that links wages at firms with unemployment risk δ with their solid-firm equivalent
wage as the solution to a partial differential equation.
Lemma 1. The reservation (equivalent) wage function w∗(ws, δ) is the solution to the following partial dif-
ferential equation
∂w∗(ws, δ)
∂ws
=
r + δ + λ1(1−
∫
Fˆ (w∗(ws, δ′)|δ′)dH(δ′) )
r + δ + λ1(1−
∫
Fˆ (w∗(ws, δ′)|δ′)dH(δ′) ) (4)
∂w∗(ws, δ)
∂δ
=
w∗(ws, δ)− ws
δ − δ , (5)
with initial conditions for every δ,
w∗(R0, δ) = R0, where R0 solves V (R0, δ) = V0. (6)
We have relegated all proofs to the appendix. Now, with the wage equivalence function in hand, we can
map all wages into their solid-firm equivalent wage, and construct its cdf.
Corollary 1: DefineF (ws) =
∫
Fˆ (w∗(ws, δ′)|δ′)dH(δ′). Then the left and right derivativesF ′−(ws), F ′+(ws)
exist a.e., and so do the second right/left derivatives of the equivalent wage function, with
∂2+w
∗
∂ws∂ws
=
λ1(δ − δ)F ′−(ws))
(r + λ1(1− F (ws)) + δ)2 ≥ 0,
∂2w∗
∂ws∂δ
=
1
(r + λ1(1− F (ws)) + δ) > 0, (7)
The solution to the PDE allows us to compare wages, and construct a wage offer distribution in terms
of solid-firm equivalent wages. Initial conditions (6) follow directly from (3), but are interesting in terms of
economics as well: they state that at the reservation wage out of unemployment, the probability of becoming
unemployed again is irrelevant.7 Job security is only valued above the reservation wage for the unemployed.
Intuitively, if one is indifferent between being in state A or B, whether one transits from one to the other, and
thus also how frequently, is irrelevant. Moreover, job security differs from e.g. standard differences in firms’
7See also Burdett and Mortensen 1980.
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productivities (as discussed in BM, or Bontemps et al. 1999) because value of job security is endogenous,
and it also depends on the distribution of wages offered in equilibrium. To be indifferent at a wage above R0,
more risky wage offers naturally should come with higher wages. However, the increase in wages required
for risky firms is increasing more than proportionally with the increase in the wage offered by the solid firm,
as wages get further away from the reservation wage. Put otherwise, there is an endogenous complementarity
between job safety and wage levels, evidenced by the positive cross derivative in Corollary 1: safety becomes
increasingly valuable at higher wages (and conversely, high wages are more valuable in safer jobs).
2.2 The Firm’s Problem and Labor Market Equilibrium
The firm’s profit can be split up in two components: (i) the wage it pays per worker, leaving an instantaneous
per-worker profit flow p−w∗(ws, δ), and (ii) the steady state amount of workers the firm has l(ws, δ). Taking
as given the firm’s δ, there is a clear trade-off between the two components: higher wages mean less profit per
worker at a given moment – but a worker will stay longer at the firm, and moreover, more potential workers
from other firms will accept offers from the firm, resulting in a larger firm size l(ws, δ). Let G(ws, δ) be the
joint distribution of solid-firm equivalent wages and unemployment risks. Steady state dictates that the mass
of workers with ws′ ≤ ws, and δ ≤ δ′ is unchanging; with standard random matching (see Podczeck and
Puzzello 2011), the dynamic evolution of the measure of workers can be expressed as8∫
δ′≤δ,R0≤ws′≤ws
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
w˜s>ws
dF (w˜s, δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,
ws≥w˜s>ws′
dF (w˜s, δ˜)
)
dG(ws′, δ′)(m− u) =∫
δ′≤δ,R0≤ws′≤ws
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,w˜s<ws′
dG(w˜s, δ˜)(m− u)
)
dF (ws′, δ′) (8)
where the LHS is the outflow consisting of (in order) the outflow to unemployment (δ′), to firms with a higher
wage w˜s > ws, and to firms with different δ′ > δ that offer wages higher than the current wage, but weakly
lower than ws; the inflow, on the RHS, comes from unemployment or from firms with δ′ > δ, with lower
equivalent wages. Steady state dictates that inflow equals outflow; using (8) we can derive the firm size. It
follows that G(ws, δ) is absolutely continuous with respect to F (ws, δ): if a subset A ∈ R2 has probability∫
A dF (w, δ) equal to zero, then the LHS of (8), adapted to integrate only over the set A, equals zero; since
δ > 0,∀δ, it must be that ∫A dG(w, δ) = 0 as well. Then, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, a function l(ws, δ)
exists such that (m− u)G(ws, δ) = ∫ wsws ∫ δδ l(w˜s, δ˜)dF (w˜s, δ˜); Roughly, l(ws, δ) corresponds to the measure
of workers divided by the measure of firms, as both get very small, and we take this as the firm size.
Lemma 2. The size of a firm posting a wage of which the equivalent wage is ws, only depends on aggregate
equivalent-wage distributions F (ws) and G(ws), and the firm’s own δ,
l(ws, δ) =
λ0u+ λ1G
−(ws)(m− u)
λ1(1− F+(ws)) + δ , (9)
where G−(ws) =
∫
ws′<ws dG(w
s′, δ′), F+(ws) =
∫
ws′≤ws dF (w
s′, δ′). (Note, these are integrated over the
entire set of δ).
8Note that, since mass can be concentrated at a single (w, δ), we are explicit whether the boundaries are included.
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Likewise for unemployment,
λ0u
∫
ws≥R0
dF (ws, δ) =
∫
δdG(ws, δ) (10)
The size of a firm will be affected by both the (equivalent) wage and its own unemployment risk. This
stands in contrast to BM and Bontemps et al., who allow many sources of heterogeneity on the firm and
worker side, but keep the property that the firm size only depends on the wage. As a direct consequence of
the dependence of firm size on (ws, δ), the distribution function of workers G(ws) =
∫
w≤ws l(w, δ)dF (w, δ),
depends on the distribution of H(δ) directly –it affects the inflows into unemployment–, as well as indirectly,
through the equilibrium wage strategies for a given type. In particular, outflows of workers into unemployment
are higher when high-δ firms dominate the lower part of the wage distribution, which makes the mass of
employed workers who are willing to move to a firm with equivalent wage ws smaller (assuming inflows from
unemployment are the same); this, in turn will affect wage strategies of firms. In equilibrium, we have to take
these dependencies into account.
To return to the firm’s optimization, a firm with layoff rate δ choosesws to maximize (p−w∗(ws, δ))l(ws, δ).
Combining lemma 1 and lemma 2, we can derive that wages will not be compensating fully for the employment
risk
Proposition 1 (Ranking Property). Suppose two firms with layoff risk δl, δh such that δl < δh offer profit
maximizing equivalent wages wsl and w
s
h. Then, we must have w
s
l ≥ wsh.
Proposition 1 is proved without reference to the shape of H(δ), and therefore holds also whether it is a
discrete, continuous, or a mixture distribution. Intuitively, the gain of posting a higher equivalent wage is
larger for more solid firms, because (i) the increase in the actual wage needed is lower, i.e. the marginal cost
of an equivalent-wage increase is lower for the solid firm, and (ii) the increase in the steady state number of
workers is higher, i.e. the marginal benefit of an equivalent-wage increase is higher. Each of the two forces
by themselves would already yield the result of proposition 1. Overall, it means that safer firms have an ad-
vantage offering higher equivalent wages, and hence higher values of employment. However, we cannot make
inferences yet about the actual wages posted; for this we have to study the equilibrium and its implications
more deeply.
Definition 1. The steady state equilibrium in this labor market consists of distributions Fˆ (w|δ), F (ws|δ),
G(ws, δ), F (ws), G(ws); an unemployment rate u; a reservation function w∗(ws, δ) for employed workers,
and a reservation wage R0 for unemployed workers, such that
1. workers’ utility maximization: acceptance decisions w∗(ws, δ), R0 are optimal, given Fˆ (w|δ) and
H(δ), and derived from (4)-(6)
2. Firms’ profit maximization: given F (ws), G(ws), for each δ, ∃pi such that ∀ ws ∈ supp F (ws|δ), it
holds that pi = (p− w∗(ws, δ))l(ws, δ) and ∀ ws /∈ supp F (ws|δ), pi ≥ (p− w∗(ws, δ))l(ws, δ)
3. steady state distributions follow from individual decisions aggregated up: F (ws|δ) is derived from
Fˆ (w|δ) andH(δ) usingw∗(ws, δ), whileG(ws, δ), and u follow from the steady state labor market flow
accounting in (8)-(10), F (ws) andG(ws) follow from
∫ ∫
w≤ws dFˆ
s(ws|δ)dH(δ), and ∫w≤ws dG(ws, δ).
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Adapting the proofs in BM and Bontemps et al. to incorporate the heterogeneity in δ, we can show that
F (ws) is a continuous, strictly increasing distribution function, and so is G(ws). The intuition for this also
follows the aforementioned papers: mass points in the distribution of offered wages or intermediate intervals
where no firms offer wages, allow discrete gains in firm size or profit per worker, while the costs of such
deviation can be made arbitrarily small.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, we can derive the following about derived distribution F (ws): (i) The support
of the distribution of equivalent wages ws offered in equilibrium is a connected set, (ii) there are no mass
points in F (ws), (iii) the lowest wage offered is R0, i.e. F (R0) = 0. Properties (i)-(iii) likewise hold for
G(ws) derived from F (ws) and (8).
Combining proposition 1 and proposition 2, the conditional distribution function Fˆ−1(δ|ws) has all prob-
ability mass concentrated at a unique δ. Conversely, if H(δ) has a continuous probability density, it also
follows that each δ posts a unique equivalent wage. Neither implies that an actual wage w∗ is offered by at
most one δ-type of firm: overlaps in the actual wage distribution (with concomitant wage cuts in transitions)
are possible, as we show below.
One of the strengths of the results is that, although now workers and firms are affected by two dimensions,
wages and job security, and the valuation of the latter is endogenous, solving for the firm size distribution and
subsequently the equilibrium wage distributions can be done (almost) as as easily and as explicitly as in BM.
We turn to this now.
2.3 Equilibrium Firm Sizes
Above we have shown that equivalent wages are a sufficient statistics for workers’ mobility decisions. More-
over, the ranking property tells us that in equilibrium the firm with rank z in the equivalent-wage distribution
has the same unemployment risk as the firm that has rank 1 − z in firm-type distribution H(δ), since in this
distribution firms are ranked from safe to risky; we formalize z below. As a result, we are able to solve for
equilibrium firm sizes without reference to equilibrium wages paid, or equivalent wages, while incorporating
that firms are heterogeneous in their unemployment risk; as detailed above, this affects their firm size even if
the rank in the equivalent-wage distribution would be the same.
Formally, define F (ws) = z; by proposition 2, we have the F (ws) is continuous and strictly increasing,
ws(z) = F−1(z) exists, and is unique. Also define δ(z) as the layoff risk associated with zth firm, starting
from the most risky firm. To deal with mass points in H(δ), define H(δ) as the closed graph of 1 − H(δ),
then let δ(z)
def
= min{δ|conv(H(δ)) = z}.9 Similarly, define Gz(z) = G(ws(z)). Moreover, using that
Fˆ−1(δ|ws) concentrates mass at a unique δ, and the absolute continuity of F (ws), which both follow from
9Taking the minimum here is without loss of generality for our results, since alternative assumptions at points where the convex
closure of H(δ) is an interval, would change δ only for a zero measure of firms.
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proposition 2, we have
Gz(z)(m− u) = G(ws)(m− u) =
∫
ws′<ws
l(ws′, δ)dF (ws′, δ)
=
∫ ws
R0
∫
δ
λ0u+ λG(w
s′)(m− u)
λ1(1− F (ws′)) + δ dFˆ
−1(δ|ws′)dF (ws′) =
∫ ws
R0
λ0u+ λG(w
s′)(m− u)
λ1(1− F (ws′)) + δ(ws)dF (w
s′)
=
∫ z
0
l(z′)dz′, where l(z′) =
λ0u+ λG
z(z′)(m− u)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′) (11)
Though the necessary substitutions above involve a surplus of notation, the intuition of the firm size is straight-
forward, and similar to the case of a finite number of firms: the steady state firm size is given by the ratio of
the rate of worker inflows to the rate of outflows. From (11), we find that Gz(z) is the solution to differential
equation,
dGz(z)
dz
=
λ0u
m−u + λ1G
z(z)
λ(1− z) + δ(z) , (12)
with initial condition Gz(0) = 0. Note that there is no reference to another equilibrium object in this formula-
tion of the distribution but Gz(z) itself. Solving for the distribution is now straightforward, and is done in the
next lemma.
Lemma 3. The cumulative density functionGz(z), and equilibrium firm size l(z) and measure of unemployed,
are given by: u = m
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
λ0+
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
= (λ0)
−1 ∫ 1
0 δ(z)l(z)dz, and
Gz(z) =
λ0u
λ1(m− u)
(
e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′)
dz′ − 1
)
, (13)
l(z) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z)+δ(z′)
dz′
. (14)
The dependence of the size of the zth-ranked firm on the unemployment risk of all lower ranked firms is
explicit in the integral term in the exponent. Solving firm size as a function of the firm rank does not only
yield a clean expression for firm size, because it does not reference parameters or variables that do not affect
firm size such as unemployment benefits b (which would turn up if we solved firm size as a function of wages,
though changing b has no effect on firm sizes); it also allows for general probability distributions of firm types
through δ(z). Concretely, this means that the formulation in lemma 2 can deal with discrete distributions as
easily as it can deal continuous distributions, or any mixture of these. We expect that this approach can be
applied more generally when a firm-specific factor leads to differences in firm sizes for the same rank in the
workers’ ranking of firms, as long as one can establish a ranking property along the lines of proposition 1.10
10We can be more explicit in the case of a pure discrete and a purely continuous distribution. For a continuous probability density
h(δ) with H ′(δ) = h(δ) > 0, δ(z) is differentiable everywhere with δ′(z) > 0, and with the appropriate change of variable , this
results in
l(δ) =
λ0u
λ1 + δ¯
e
∫ δ¯
δ −
(
2λ1h(δ)+1
λ1(1−H(δ))+δ
)
dδ˜
.
In case of a discrete distribution h(δj), j = 1, . . . , J, with
∑
j h(δj) = 1 and δ¯ = δ1 > . . . > δ = δJ , lemma 3 tells us that the
mass of workers in δi firms, v(δi) can be derived from (13), using e
∫ b
a
λ1
λ1(1−z)+δ dz = λ1(1−za)+δ
λ1(1−zb)+δ . Suppose that
∑j−1
i=1 h(δi) < z <
9
2.4 Equilibrium Wage Distributions
We can set up the maximization problem equivalently such that, given equilibrium equivalent-wages ws(z),
no firm strictly prefers a ranking different than its own. Then, the problem becomes
max
z′
(p− w∗(ws(z′), δ(z)))ld(z′, δ(z)), (15)
where it follows from (9) and lemmas 2 and 3 that the firm size of a firm with δ, offering an equivalent wage
ws′ that is ranked at z′ = F (ws′), is
ld(z′, δ) =
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′)
λ1(1− z′) + δ l(z
′) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z′) + δ e
∫ z′
0
λ1
λ1(1−z˜)+δ(z˜)dz˜. (16)
A firm can change the job-to-job separations by providing a higher value to the worker, but cannot change the
unemployment risk. From (16), we see that ld(z′, δ(z)) is differentiable in z′.The first order condition of (15)
with respect to z′, evaluated at the equilibrium choice, z = z′ is
(p− w∗(ws(z), δ(z))) ∂l
d(z, δ)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ(z)
−
(
∂w∗(ws(z), δ(z))
∂ws(z)
dws(z)
dz
)
ld(z, δ(z)) = 0 (17)
This can be rewritten as
∂w∗(ws(z),δ(z))
∂ws(z)
dws(z)
dz
(p− w∗(ws(z), δ(z))) =
∂ld(z′,δ)
∂z′
∣∣∣
δ=δ(z′)
l(z, δ(z))
(18)
Safer firms gain more, relatively and absolutely, when they improve their position in the firm ranking: ∂
2 ln l(z′,δ)
∂z′∂δ =
− 2λ1
(λ1(1−z′)+δ)2 . Then, ceteris paribus, safer firms have a higher term on the RHS of (18) and thus will compete
more heavily; on the LHS of (18), this force pushes equivalent wages ws(z) further upwards with z.
The change of wage actually paid with the firm rank is
dw∗(ws(z), δ(z))
dz
=
∂w∗(ws(z), d(z))
∂ws(z)
dws(z)
dz
+
∂w∗(ws(z), d(z))
∂δ(z)
δ′(z). (19)
where we used that the function δ(z) is differentiable a.e. and everywhere right-differentiable; with abuse of
notation δ′(z) is the associated right-derivative. Then, we can decompose this wage change into two parts: the
competition component discussed above in (18), ∂w
∗(ws(z),δ(z))
∂ws(z)
dws(z)
dz , and the effect through the composition
of firms on the labor market; with δ′(z) derived fromH(δ), capturing how fast job security increases with firm
rank. Substituting (18) into the last expression, yields
dw∗(z)
dz
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)(V (w∗(z)), δ(z)− V0). (20)
While the firm’s optimization pins down dw
s(z)
dz , increased job security of the higher ranked firm itself could de-
liver part of the increased ws (for a given wage paid). If workers value job security a lot, i.e. V (w∗(z), δ(z))−
1−∑Ji=j+1 h(δi) for some j. Then from (13),
G(z) =
λ0u
λ1(m− u)
(
λ1(1−∑Ji=j h(δi)) + δj
λ1(1− z) + δj
j−1∏
i=1
λ1(1−∑Jh=i h(δi)) + δi
λ1(1−∑Jh=i+1 h(δi)) + δi − 1
)
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V0 is high, or whenever, the firm’s job security is much higher, i.e. δ′(z) < 0 and large in absolute value, this
force can be strong.
The strength of these forces varies with the rank of the firm in the firm-level job-security distribution.
For firms high in the the distribution, the value of employment is significantly different from the value of
unemployment; this means that the term V (w∗(z), δ(z))−V0 is relatively large. However, simultaneously, for
these safer firms, the gains of holding on to their workers are larger, and hence these firms will compete more
fiercely, as argued below equation (18). It is therefore not a foregone conclusion whether wages paid will rise
or fall with firm-level job security, nor is it immediate that a greater valuation of job security on the worker
side will indeed lead to wage cuts, as it simultaneously also raises the value of retaining a worker to the firm.
One can see that δ′(z) can potentially play an important role here, scaling V (w∗(z), δ(z))− V0, and therefore
the strength of the forces. In the next section, we study the occurrence or absence of wage cuts in exchange
for job security: both can occur but depend in part on the distribution of firm types, which is an important
determinant of the extent of competition among firms. The workers’ marginal rate of substitution between
wages and job security (derived in section 2.1) by itself is only half of the story; firms’ imperfect competition
is the other half.
Let us finish this section by putting all pieces together: we can find (w∗(z), ws(z)) as the solution a
system of two differential equations, one from using (17) which tells us ∂w
s(z)
∂z , and (20) combined with (3),
which tells us ∂w
∗(z)
dz , both as functions of parameters, distributions and wages w
s(z), w∗(z). The solution
{ws(z), w∗(z)} fully characterizes the equilibrium. Moreover, we are able to establish the existence and
uniqueness of this equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Existence, Uniqueness, Characterization). Consider functions {w∗(z), ws(z)}, andR0 ∈ R, such
that w∗(z), ws(z) are a solution to the system of two ODEs, with, for all z at which δ(z) is continuous,
dws(z)
dz
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
r + δ + λ1(1− z)
r + δ(z) + λ1(1− z) (21)
dw∗(z)
dz
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) +
δ′(z)
(δ(z)− δ)(w
∗(z)− ws(z)), (22)
and a jump discontinuity at every zˇ such that limz↑zˇ δ(z) > δ(zˇ), such that w∗(z) will jump according to
w∗(zˇ) =
δ(zˇ)− δ
limz↑zˇ δ(z)− δ
(
lim
z↑zˇ
w∗(z)− ws(zˇ)
)
+ ws(zˇ)., (23)
under initial conditions ws(0) = w∗(z) = R0, where R0 additionally satisfies
R0 = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
1− z
r + λ1(1− z) + δ
dws(z)
dz
dz (24)
Denote the inverse of ws(z) at a given ωs by (ws)−1(ωs). The distribution functions F (ωs) = (ws)−1(ωs),
G(ωs) = Gz((ws)−1(ωs)), reservation functionw∗(ws, δ), and u, Fˆ (w|δ),G(ws, δ),F (ws|δ), all constructed
from {ws(z), w∗(z), R0} are the functions associated with the steady state equilibrium in the environment; if
0 ≤ λ1 ≤ λ0, this steady state is unique.
In this setting it is necessary to follow a path different from BM and Bontemps et al. towards character-
izing the equilibrium wage distribution: neither wages or values (which, in our setting, maps one-to-one to
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equivalent wages) alone are sufficient to characterize the equilibrium. How powerful competition is driving up
the values offered to workers depends on wages through the instantaneous profit flows p− w∗, and it depends
on the job security of the firm in question. On the other hand, how wages comove with job security depends on
the valuation of job security, which consist of the job value (or equivalent wages) lost when losing a job, and
how likely this transition is. Crucially, not all elements of equilibrium depend on wages and equivalent wages:
firm size only depends on the rank of the firm and its associated job security. Exploiting this, we are able to
solve for equilibrium firm sizes first, and then simultaneously find the wages and equivalent wage distributions
that have to arise with these firm size.
It is perhaps insightful to compare the case with heterogeneous unemployment risk to the standard case
in BM and Bontemps et al. without this heterogeneity (δ(z) = δ˜ ∀ z). In the absence of heterogeneity
in δ(z), the two equations (21) and (22) become identical to each other: the differential equation w′(z) =
(p− w(z))(2λ1/(λ1(1− z) + δ)) with initial condition w(0) = R0 has solution
p− w(z)
p−R0 =
(
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1 + δ
)2
=⇒ F (w) = δ + λ1
λ1
(
1−
(
p− w
p−R0
)0.5)
, (25)
which, on the LHS, is precisely the wage distribution in BM.11
Note that one way of showing existence and uniqueness in Burdett-Mortensen model would combine the
left expression in (25) with (24), to show that T (R0) is linear inR0, while T (p) = b, and T (r) < r, for r small
enough. The proof of theorem 1 relies on the same method: we can rescale the differential equation (22) by
p− w∗, and show that the term w∗(z)−ws(z)p−w∗(z) is independent of R0, and therefore just a function of parameters,
unemployment risk distribution H(δ) and firm rank z. Then, one can show that a term A(z) exists and again
depends only on parameters, H(δ), and firm rank, such that p − w∗(z) = (p − R0)A(z), which establishes
uniqueness, and the continuity needed for the existence proof.
3 Wages and Transition Hazards
In the previous section, we derived equations which characterized how wages, worker’s values, and firm qual-
ities are linked in equilibrium. In this section, we look more concretely at the labor market outcomes implied
by the characterization.
First, since safer jobs are more attractive jobs, workers in safe jobs are much less likely to separate from
these jobs, whether to unemployment or to another job. This implies the following (where we have, once
again, relegated all proofs to the appendix),
Result 1. The transition rate into unemployment as a function of tenure is decreasing in tenure.
To condense language, we will refer to this particular transition rate as the unemployment hazard. Thus,
the standard BM model, augmented with firm heterogeneity in unemployment risk, is able to reproduce an
11Exploiting the ranking property inherent in BM-type models allows one to incorporate more heterogeneity in standard models.
Here, we deal with firm heterogeneity that cannot be incorporated straightforwardly in the standard model, where e.g. there is a simple,
unique one-dimensional mapping between wages and worker’s values. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) exploit a similar ranking
property to deal with time-varying aggregate productivity, an otherwise notoriously difficult problem.
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unemployment hazard that in the aggregate declines with tenure (as well as with time spent in employment),
as it does in the data.12
Next, we consider the relationship between the unemployment risk a worker faces, and the wage he re-
ceives. If wages are increasing in the job security that the firm offers, there is in some sense a strong failure
of compensating wage differentials: not only do riskier firms offer lower employment values (established in
proposition 1), but in fact they offer values so much lower that in addition to a higher unemployment risk they
actually pay lower wages. For those jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution, we can derive the following,
without restrictions on parameters or the firm distribution.
Result 2. The lowest wage,R0, is paid by the firm with the highest unemployment risk. There exists a nontrivial
interval of wages [R0, wˆ] where job security increases with wages
Under typical conditions, spelled out next, this interval can span a large part of the wage distribution, while
on the other hand, wage cuts can also occur higher up in the wage distribution. For analytic simplicity and to be
consistent with steady state profit maximization, we let r → 0, and consider mainly the case of a distribution
of firm unemployment risk with a differentiable pdf h(δ).
Result 3. In equilibrium the relation between wages and job security depends on the firm distribution of
unemployment risk in the following way:
1. If h′(δ) ≤ 0, wages increase with job security (i.e. dw∗dz > 0 at z˜ such that z˜ = 1−H(δ).)
2. Wage cuts for increased job security will occur if
h(δ)
δ + λ(1−H(δ)) <
∫ δ¯
δ
δ + λ1(1−H(δ˜))
(δ˜ + λ(1−H(δ˜)))3h(δ˜)dδ˜ (26)
As an example where this can arise, consider densities h(δ) that have a thin left-tail with sufficient kurtosis,
where h(δ)δ rises sufficiently fast in the left tail. In particular, for any distribution with
h(δ)
δ <
∫ δ¯
δ
δ
δ2
h(δ˜)
δ
dδ˜,
wage cuts will occur for λ1 small enough. In case of a discrete distribution, the existence of wage cuts will
follow directly from (23)13; however, intuitively, this relates closely to the case where h(δ) = 0 on an interval,
which also leads to wage cuts according to (26).
In figure 1, we have drawn wages as a function of underlying unemployment risk as an example, for a
particular set of parameters.14 Note that the firm distribution with almost completely decreasing density does
not generate any wage cuts, but for the other two distributions, with the clear left tails, wage cuts occur when
moving to the safest firms. Since climbing up the ladder occurs in increasingly smaller steps, and the steady
state mass of workers is distributed heavily towards the safest firms, this means that a significant amount
of workers will be taking wage cuts. For example, in a job with an unemployment risk near or below 2%,
any subsequent job-to-job move will come with a wage cut, in case of the dashed distribution (which is a
log-normal with standard deviation 0.03). On the other end, the lowest wages come with significantly higher
unemployment risk. At these wages, who are taken in relatively large proportion by the unemployed, we see a
complete absence of compensating wage differentials.
12See e.g. Menzio et al. 2012.
13We discussed this type of wage cuts extensively in a previous version of the paper.
14Note that the proof of theorem 1 establishes that the shape of the function that links wages to unemployment risk does not depend
on R0, b, λ0.
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Figure 1: Left panel: log-normal distributions of δ, with standard deviation 0.03 (dashed), 0.2 (dotted), 2.0
(solid). Right panel: wages as a function of unemployment risk (λ1 = 0.23, r = 0.0025, R0 = 0.7, p = 1)
If the distribution of firm types is uniform, the (increasing) competition between firms of similar types
drives up the wages, even though workers value job security increasingly. More generally, this result implies
that there cannot be any wage cuts where the density is falling in δ. Concretely, for any unimodal distribution,
wages will be increasing with job security at least until the modal firm. Wage cuts can occur in the left tail
when safer firms become increasingly rare; those firms do not face as much direct competition from similar
firms, and as a result can post wages that keep the worker closer to their indifference with respect to the job
security of lower ranked firms. In general, the complementarity between wages and job security works both
on the firm’s and worker’s sides, and can push actual wages either up or down, depending on the distribution.
We think that this is a nice illustration of the value of studying unemployment risk and wage setting in a full-
fledged labor market equilibrium setting, as the willingness to take wage cuts for safety for workers could be
offset by the increased competition by firms for now longer valuable workers. Finally, note that the presence
of wage cuts to transition to a more secure job means that, controlling for wages, the transition probability (to
other firms, to unemployment, and therefore also the general separation hazard) decreases in tenure.
The degree to which firms are in competition with each other is linked to parameter λ1: an increase in this
parameter makes it easier for higher ranked firms to poach workers from lower-ranked firms, and thus raises
firm competition. One could think that an increase in competition among firms will lead firms to offer less
dispersed employment values in equilibrium and hence trace out more closely the workers’ marginal rate of
substitution between job security and wages. This turns out not to occur; instead we can find a lower bound
on λ˜1 for a given distribution H(δ) (with h′(δ)/h(δ)2 bounded from above), such that above this λ˜1, for any
λ0 and b, wages will be increasing in job security throughout.
Result 4. If λ1 > h′(δ)/(h(δ))2, wages will be increasing in job security at δ (dw∗(z)/dz > 0 at z =
1 − H(δ)), for any λ0, b. If h′(δ)/(h(δ))2 is bounded from above, there exists λ˜1 such that for all λ1 > λ˜1
14
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wages are increasing in job security for all δ, for any b, λ0.
Thus, as the labor market gets more competitive, the scope for wage cuts disappears. In this result, we
keep b and λ0 constant15; while it becomes progressively easier for employed workers to move from job to
job, unemployed workers keep leaving unemployment at the same rate. This keeps the cost of losing one’s
job bounded away from zero, even as λ1 becomes very large. (In the limit: V1(δ) − V0 = p−br+λ+δ .) Thus
when λ1 becomes large enough, the increased competition between firms will drive up wages with job security
throughout the entire wage distribution, even though workers keep experiencing a loss of lifetime utility when
becoming unemployed. Increased competition among firms does not lead to the payment of compensating
wage differentials, it does, quite surprisingly, lead to the opposite, as it strengthens the motive of the low-δ
firms to compete with similar firms. To prove this, we heavily rely on the ranking property, which holds for
every λ1, and thus the firm ranking is preserved throughout any limit taking with respect to λ1 (and λ0). Thus,
we can calculate firm sizes easily as a function of the rank of the firm as we approach the limit without having
to recalculate the wage distribution. In turn, firm profit maximizing decisions are then still easily characterized,
following theorem 1, even as we move towards the limit, λ1 →∞.
We can also study the case where we let search frictions for both unemployed and employed workers
disappear in the limit.
Result 5. Let λ0 > λ1, λ1 →∞, λ0 →∞, while keeping λ1λ0 = α < 1 constant. Then w∗(z)→ p for all z.
If we let the frictions for the unemployed disappear, we converge to the same limit as in the standard
BM model without heterogeneity in δ, which equals competitive outcome w(z) = p ∀ z, again without any
compensation for unemployment risk. To see this, note that for reservation wage out of unemployment, R0,
the following holds
R0 − b
p−R0 =(α− 1)
∫ 1
0
λ1(1− z)
δ + λ(1− z)
δ + λ1(1− z)
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
p− w∗(z)
p−R0 dz (27)
≥ (α− 1)
∫ 1
0
2λ21(1− z)
(δ¯ + λ(1− z))2dz = −2
λ1
λ1 + δ¯
+ 2 log
δ¯ + λ1
δ¯
(28)
As we let λ1 go to infinity in (27), it follows that R0 → p, as the RHS goes to infinity. Since p > w∗(z) ≥ R0,
it follows that all wages go to p. Since the bound in result 4 is uniform in λ0, we also know that for λ1 large
enough, wages will become increasing in job security for all δ in the process.
As we approach the competitive limit no compensating wages are paid, and all firms are still active. In
the case where search frictions also disappear in the limit for the unemployed, job security will cease to be
a payoff relevant dimension for workers. This is intuitive because, apart from the loss of ‘search capital’,
there is no additional cost to unemployment.16 Decreasing λ1, λ0 means that search frictions become more
important, which implies that job security becomes more important, and competition between firms becomes
more limited, which raises the potential for wage cuts. Thus somewhat ironically, wage cuts, which seem to
relate closely to the notion of compensating wages paid in competitive settings, are in the environment we
15Result 4 is actually stronger, it says that this bound on λ1 will hold, entirely independent of λ0 and b.
16If a transition into unemployment comes with an explicit cost instead or in addition to a search cost, then in the limiting economy
only the low turnover firms would survive.
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study actually associated with a low degree of competition among firms. Though ironic, the result is intuitive:
a low λ1 means that climbing up the job ladder is a slow process in which gains are lost when becoming
unemployed; therefore, at a lower λ1, workers will value job security more, ceteris paribus. Likewise, a lower
λ1 lowers the competition among firms, i.e. the relative gains of being higher in the wage ranking are lower
when λ1 is low, hence higher ranked firms will not increase the values (equivalent wages) that they offer
workers as much. This, however, does not mean that result 4 immediately follows from the intuition: we
need to use, explicitly, the equilibrium characterization, because the lower values offered by the firms due to
the lower competition reduce the valuation of job security, potentially more than offsetting the direct (ceteris
paribus) effect of the decrease in λ1 on the workers’ valuation of job security. However, result 4 implies that
this is not the case, and with a lower λ1 more cases can occur where firms with higher job security promise a
lower equivalent wage increase than is delivered by their increased job security alone, and as a result will offer
lower wages, thus leading to wage cuts in equilibrium.
4 Discussion
Above we have showed that heterogeneity on the firm side alone can explain, in frictional labor markets, the
absence of compensating wages for unemployment risk and the persistence of low wages and unemployment
spells for workers. The same observations are typically explained by (additional) heterogeneity elsewhere:
perhaps most prominently, persistent differences in worker qualities, or alternatively, differences in the match
qualities which need to be to some extent unknown at the start of the match. These different dimensions of
heterogeneity have further empirical implications that can be used to gauge their importance. Also, concretely,
they imply differences in the risks workers face in the labor market. From this follow different implications
for welfare in general, and policy effectiveness in particular. While these other dimensions are doubtlessly
important, we argue below that a potentially large role is left open for heterogeneity in the firm-level component
of job security, and we discuss how one can distinguish the latter from other heterogeneity.
Persistent heterogeneity in worker quality In this line of explanation, we don’t see compensating wages for
job security for seemingly identical workers because the workers in low-paid, insecure jobs are in fact different
from those in better-paid, secure jobs. Workers’ low (unobservable) ability, however, does not in itself imply
that their job durations have to be short: it is necessary to have, additionally, informational frictions or another
dimension of heterogeneity. For example, the correlation between wages and job security could occur because
low-ability workers are also unstable workers: they prefer not to stay with the same employer for long (Salop
and Salop 1976). Alternatively, their skills are less job specific, making them more mobile (Neal 1998), or
they are repeatedly screened out during a lower-wage probationary period (Wang and Weiss 1998). Finally, to
incorporate the correlation between firm characteristics with wages and job security, one can introduce firm
heterogeneity such that low-ability workers sort into the relevant subset of firms. Employment in these firms
is insecure either because of aforementioned explanations, or because these firms are themselves unstable (as
e.g. proposed in Evans and Leighton 1989).17
17To study this setting theoretically, one could, for example, extend the model of Albrecht and Vroman (2002) with on-the-job
search and increased match-breakup rates for the low productivity firms. Since this model would incorporate both firm and worker
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If differences in persistent worker quality are indeed behind the aforementioned patterns on the labor mar-
ket, every piece of a worker’s labor market history will be informative about his underlying quality, including
the unobservable component. On the contrary, if behind these patterns is heterogeneity non-specific to the
worker, in firm or match quality, the labor market history is only relevant to the extent that it is correlated with
the current firm or match quality. In this extreme case, unemployed workers –who are not in a match with a
firm– are all alike, and the labor market history before the unemployment spell, or even the previous duration
of the current unemployment spell, becomes irrelevant. At the same time, since being unemployed can imply
that subsequent employment occurs in a lower quality match or firm, being unemployed can still predict worse
future labor market outcomes, compared to those who remained employed. Suggestive of the importance of
firm or match heterogeneity rather than worker heterogeneity is the irrelevance of previous history is the ex-
perience of workers who lost their job in a mass layoff, and can expect lower wages and a higher likelihood
of repeated spells of unemployment, even when their previous labor market history was spotless (see, e.g.
Stevens 1997)18 Likewise, we could test whether workers with ‘bad’ labor market histories can make these
irrelevant by finding employment in good matches or good firms. Stewart (2007) argues that this is indeed an
important feature of the labor market, while using linked employer-employee data Holzer, Lane and Vilhuber
(2005) argue that good employment that allows for an escape from low earnings, is concentrated in ‘good’
firms.
Thus, there are ways to econometrically identify whether diminished labor market outcomes after an un-
employment spell are “due to a causal effect of being unemployed (or working) or a manifestation of a stable
trait?” (Heckman 2001). Further, it is also possible (though not necessarily easy) to distinguish the causal effect
of unemployment per se, from the effect of unemployment duration, which could pick up skill depreciation or
a worsening perception of unobserved quality. Controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among
workers along these lines, Arulampalam et. al. 2000 find that unemployment status per se generate a higher
probability of future unemployment spells. (They find that it explains 40% of the persistence in employment
for mature men). Böheim and Taylor (2002) find that it is unemployment incidence, rather than duration that
has the major impact on future labor market outcomes. Recently, attention has also turned to identifying how
future labor market outcomes are affected by being in a low-paid job – while similarly attempting to control
for selection on unobserved quality into low-paid jobs. Although data limitations often allow only a coarse
categorization of jobs as low- or high-paid, Cappellari and Jenkins (2008), and Uhlendorf (2006) find that
being in a low-paid job itself increases the probability of becoming unemployed relative to the same person
being in a high-paid job, thus showing once a worker is in unemployment, there is a risk of a low-pay/no-pay
cycle. All this is suggestive that there is a role to play for heterogeneity on the firm side, as argued in this
heterogeneity, it would be a good tool to measure the contribution of firm and worker heterogeneity, and their interaction. Kaas and
Carrillo-Tudela (2011) show that in a setting with on-the-job search, and persistent worker heterogeneity, initially unobservable for
the firm, heterogeneity in the wage strategies can give rise to low wage employment and repeated unemployment spells of low ability
workers.
18Plant closing arguably reduces the selection problem among workers, once it sends all workers, good or bad, to unemployment.
Often it is argued that still, there is some selection issues as the workers that stay around in the firm until the final moments might not
be an unbiased sample. However, such problem can be address by including all workers who left in the years before the closure, as
well as by constructing the right control group, as e.g. in Eliason and Storrie 2006, where wage and repeat unemployment effects are
still found. See also Hijzen, Upward and Wright (2008).
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paper.
Match Heterogeneity When match quality cannot be observed prior to forming the match, but is instead
slowly learned as time in the job increases, the unemployment hazard that results is typically initially increas-
ing, then decreasing. Also, wages and job security will be positively correlated, reflecting the weeding out of
the bad matches, and as such is consistent with the lack of compensating differentials. However, in this theory,
in its most basic form, there is no role for firms. After controlling for a worker’s tenure, there should be no
correlation of the unemployment hazard and firm characteristics. However, firm characteristics typically do
correlate significantly with the unemployment hazard after controlling for tenure (e.g. Winter-Ebmer 2001).
Learning is linked to the variation of the unemployment hazard with tenure, ceteris paribus, while our paper
concerns itself with the variation in average unemployment risk across firms. It would be very interesting to
decompose the variation in unemployment hazard into these across-tenure and across-firm variation.19
Looking at wages, we are further able to distinguish between ex ante known firm-specific job security and
learning. For learning theory, maintaining the standard assumption that wages are tied to expected productivity
(see Moscarini 2005 for a discussion), the separation hazard goes up with tenure when one controls for wages,
while in our theory it decreases with tenure. Behind this lies a different impact of uncertainty: in the case of
learning, among two matches with the same wage and thus same expected productivity, the most uncertain
match is preferred. The reason is that the option to move out of the match insures the worker against bad
realizations, diminishing the impact of the increased downside risk, while the increase in the upside risk
is more fully enjoyed by the worker. In the empirically relevant setting with firm-specific job security, an
increase in uncertainty is a decrease in job security, which lowers the value of a match for a given wage.
Focussing on wage cuts, we can likewise distinguish between the two theories. In the theory of learning
about match quality, workers can move to a new match with a wage cut when the new match has a lower
expected match quality but at the same time sufficiently more dispersion of possible outcomes, and hence
more upside potential. Then, conditional on match survival, one would observe higher wage growth after a
wage cut. This motive also arises elsewhere, in a different set of models where employed workers meet other
firms occasionally, but upon such a meeting a bidding war for the worker in question is triggered (Postel-Vinay
and Robin 2002, e.g.). In this setting, a worker is willing to take a lower initial wages in firms that will improve
his wage prospects for the future: either because the current firm will pay more later to retain the worker, when
it has to compete for the worker with another firm, or because the worker is able to secure a higher starting
value when it is poached by another firm. In this case and in the case of the learning model, wage cuts are an
investment in future wage growth. In our model, a wage cut is an investment in job security, and as such will
not show up in eventually increased wages, but in terms of increased job durations.
Connolly and Gottschalk (2008) investigate the empirical importance of this motive for wage cuts and
find that for males only 20% of the transitions with immediate wage cuts can be rationalized by future wage
growth, thus suggesting that other factors, including job security, could be a significant driving force for wage
19It would be even better if we could use matched employer-employee data and decompose the variation into worker-specific,
firm-specific and tenure-specific variation. Arai and Heyman (2001) using Swedish matched employer-employee data, is the only
paper we know that does this; they find that tenure, worker fixed effects and firm fixed effects all turn up as significant correlates of
unemployment risk.
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cuts. Likewise, in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), the option-value motive can explain a part of the extent of
downward wage mobility, but it also leaves open a significant part for other explanations.20
Heterogeneity and risk in the labor market The amount of uncertainty a worker faces depends on the
relevant dimensions of heterogeneity that underlie different outcomes. In the case of worker heterogeneity,
uncertainty has resolved mostly before the labor market: workers have their own job ladders, some more
slippery than others. In the case of match heterogeneity, every transition involves a temporary increase in
uncertainty when match quality in initially unknown. This means that (in the absence of firm-specific policies
that reduce this uncertainty before the match is formed), transitions at any point in the wage ladder carry risk
– though this risk might take the form of wage risk or unemployment risk, depending how good the match
looked from an ex ante perspective (allowing for ex ante signals). Every step on the job ladder is, in some
sense, taken blindly, and the worker might end up higher or lower than expected. A worker who, after learning
the match quality, stays put, is not subjecting himself to this uncertainty anymore. On the contrary, in this
paper, job transitions progressively decrease the risk of job loss, and the higher the worker is on the job ladder,
the more stable he stands. A fall, however, results in a new start at the bottom of the wage ladder. Moreover,
contrary to the case of learning, a there is no added uncertainty associated with taking a step, but rather a gain
of stability.
All of the above three dimensions of heterogeneity imply that workers differ in their expectations of in-
come and in the extent of uncertainty about this income, but each dimension has very different implications
for endogenous responses of workers, such as the degree of self-insurance. Workers might select a different
amount or type of human capital to avoid ending up with characteristics that lead to insecure, low-wage em-
ployment. In the case of match uncertainty, risk-averse workers might save more before undertaking a risky
job change, or stay with a current match to avoid being subject to additional uncertainty, something becoming
more important when e.g. close to a borrowing constraint.21 When jobs out of unemployment are likely at
more insecure firms, workers can improve their income security by moving to a more stable firm (as opposed
to staying in a match). Foreseeing that loss of employment would raise the risk of repeat unemployment spells,
employed workers might self-insure more, but as the unemployment probability at the top of the wage ladder
is low while the climb back is hard, they might, ex post, still suffer a larger loss of utility upon becoming
unemployed than e.g. when the unemployment risk is more evenly spread across firms.
These considerations also have implications for the public policies to allow further insurance against ad-
verse income and employment shocks. If employment security is in part determined at the firm level, then
worker training might not be as effective as thought in mitigating a seeming ‘unemployment scar’, as trained
workers might be hired by the same firms at the bottom of the firm distribution. If firm-specific unemploy-
ment risk and wages are negatively correlated, workers have more dispersed lifetime discounted utilities than
20The wages generated by the simulations from the estimated model in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) imply a constant or lower
wage (i.e. wage cut) after the first job-to-job transition in 24%-38% of the cases, and a wage cut of five or more percent in 28.5%-
42.9% of the cases. In the data on which the model is estimated, this percentage varies from 32.1%-54.5%, respectively 4.4%-22.9%
for a five or more percent wage cut. These ranges are the values among the seven occupational categories on which the model is
estimated separately.
21These different responses imply that one could use savings and consumption data to further distinguish between the different
dimensions of uncertainty.
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those based on wages combined with the same, average, unemployment risk counterfactually assigned to all
matches. Then, unemployment benefits could conceivably be more beneficial than in standard settings, be-
cause the expected discounted lifetime income loss upon becoming unemployed is larger when subsequent
jobs are more likely to end in unemployment.22
All in all, firm-level heterogeneity in unemployment risk can provide an explanation for worker-flow and
wage patterns that were the focus of this paper, but moreover, it has implications that differ from theories based
on match or worker heterogeneity. On one hand, this means that one can distinguish between these dimensions
of heterogeneity and measure their importance, and on the other hand, that care has to be taken that policies
are optimal given the measured importance of each dimension.23
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model with homogeneous workers and search frictions in which, in equi-
librium, wages do not compensate for differences in unemployment risk. Therefore, workers move, whenever
they have the chance, from risky companies to more stable firms, which then are also larger. We show that
wages increase with job security for the lowest wages; this pattern can extend over a significant part of the
wage distribution. While safer firms can offer lower wages while still attracting more workers, the increased
job duration makes a worker more valuable to the firm, and hence raises their incentive to prevent worker
mobility to other firms, which puts an upwards force on wages. The second force dominates at low wages, but
higher in the wage distribution, depending on the distribution of the heterogeneous firms, the first force can
dominate – thus leading to wage cuts.
The model also generates an unemployment hazard rate that is declining with tenure, as in the data, while
in the standard Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model it is counterfactually constant. We thus show that unem-
ployment scarring in terms of wages and risk of repeated job losses, arises in equilibrium, resulting neither
from an decline in (perceived) productivity of workers when they become unemployed, nor as a manifestation
of a selection effect on workers, but because of heterogeneity on the firm side.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
Proof of lemma 1 The initial conditions (6) follow directly from putting V (w, δ) − V0 = 0 in (3). For (4),
note first that it can be established straightforwardly that V (w, δ) is continuous, increasing and bounded in w,
and therefore differentiable a.e., and therefore it follows that the same properties also hold for w∗(ws, δ) by
(3). The value of employment at (w, δ) satisfies
(r + δ)V (ws, δ) = ws + δV0 + λ1
∫ ∫
w∗(ws,δ)
V (w′, δ′s, δ)dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′). (29)
=⇒ ∂V (w
s, δ)
∂ws
=
1
r + δ + λ1
∫ ∫ w¯
w∗(ws,δ) dFˆ (w
′|δ′)dH(δ′) , a.e. (30)
where we have used that the derivative with respect to lower bound of the inner integral, w∗(ws, δ), equals
zero for every δ, since it is evaluated where V (w∗(ws, δ), δ) = V (ws, δ). Using (3) and (29), the latter both
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evaluated at V (w, δ) and V0 = V (R0, δ), we have
w∗(ws, δ) = ws + (δ − δ)
(
(r + δ)−1
(
ws −R0 − λ1
(∫ ∫ w∗(ws,δ′)
R0
V (w′, δ′)dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′)
+
∫ ∫ w¯
w∗(ws,δ′)
V (ws, δ)dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′)−
∫ ∫ w¯
R0
V0dFˆ (w
′|δ′)dH(δ′)
))
(31)
=⇒ ∂w
∗(ws, δ)
∂ws
=
r + δ
r + δ
− (δ − δ)
r + δ
λ1
∫ ∫
w∗(ws,δ′)
dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′)∂V (w
s, δ)
∂ws
=
r + δ + λ1
∫ ∫
w∗(ws,δ′) dFˆ (w
′|δ′)dH(δ′)
r + δ + λ1
∫ ∫
w∗(ws,δ′) dFˆ (w
′|δ′)dH(δ′) , a.e. (32)
and (4) now follows. For (5) note that ∂w
∗(ws,δ)
∂δ = V (w
s, δ) − V0 = w
∗(ws,δ)−ws
δ−δ . The second derivatives
follow from straightforward differentiation.
Proof of lemma 2 In this proof, we show that the appropriate ratio of limits of a sequence of sets agrees
with (9) almost everywhere (with respect to F (w, δ)). (We do not have to worry about a set of measure zero
for overall outcomes: anything that happens on a set of measure zero won’t affect the profit maximization of
other agents, or is otherwise relevant for outcomes in equilibrium. Hence, if we can establish l(ws, δ) a.e. we
are done.) First, we can define
I(δ, ws)
def
=
∫
δ′≤δ,R0≤ws′≤ws
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
w˜s>ws
dF (w˜s, δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,
ws≥w˜s>ws′
dF (w˜s, δ˜)
)
dG(ws′, δ′)(m− u)
−
∫
δ′≤δ,R0≤ws′≤ws
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,w˜s<ws′
dG(w˜s, δ˜)(m− u)
)
dF (ws′, δ′)
(33)
Then, for δ′′ > δ′ and ws′′ > ws′, we have I(δ′′, ws′′)− I(δ′, ws′′)− I(δ′′, ws′) + I(δ′, ws′) = 0. After some
tedious algebra, in which we drop the terms (i.e. flows) that cancel each other out, add up the remaining flows
where possible, but split the integral such that in one set the upper bound is not included and in the other set
the wage to integrate over is a singleton {ws′′}; this results in∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
ws′<w<ws′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
w˜s>ws′′
dF (w˜s, δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
w<w˜≤ws′′
dF (w˜, δ˜)
)
dG(w, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
w=ws′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
w˜s>ws′′
dF (w˜s, δ˜)
)
dG(w, δ)
=
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
ws′<w<ws′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
w˜s≤ws′
dG(w˜s, δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
ws′≤w˜<w
dG(w˜, δ˜)
)
dF (w, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
w=ws′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
w˜s≤ws′
dG(w˜s, δ˜)
)
dF (w, δ) (34)
Now, we can take the limit as δ′ → δ′′ and ws′ → ws′′. There are two cases: (i) ∫w=ws′′,all δ dF (w, δ) = 0,
and (ii)
∫
w=ws′′,all δ dF (w, δ) > 0. In case (i), the terms on the second and fourth line equal zero, while
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the rightmost terms in the integral on the first and third line are equal in value to an integral that has a strict
upper or lower on wages, i.e. λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
w<w˜≤ws′′
dF (w˜, δ˜) = λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
w<w˜<ws′′
dF (w˜, δ˜)
def
= T (w, δ′). Moreover, T is
continuous at (δ′′, ws′′) with T (δ′′, ws′′) = 0 , so we have
(δ+λ1(1−F (ws′′))
lim δ′→δ′′
ws′→ws′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
ws′<w≤ws′′
dG(w, δ)
lim δ′→δ′′
ws′→ws′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
ws′<w≤ws′′
dF (w, δ)
= (δ+λ1(1−F (ws′′))l(ws′′, δ) = λ0u+λG(ws′′),
using that dG(w
s′′,δ)
dF (ws′′,δ) = l(w
s′′, δ), and that G(ws′′), F (ws′′) are continuous at ws′′. Rearranging yields (9).
For case (ii), we can first take the limit ws′ → ws′′ on both sides of the equation. The terms on the first and
third line go to zero. If the second and fourth line are zero as well, we are dealing a set {(ws, δ)|ws = ws′′, δ ∈
(δ′, δ′′]} that is of measure zero in F , which wlog for the aggregate patterns, we can ignore. Suppose therefore
that B(δ′, δ′′) def= {(ws, δ)|ws = ws′′, δ ∈ (δ′, δ′′]} is of positive measure. Then in the limit as ws′ → ws′′
(34) reduces to∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
w=ws′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
w˜s>ws′′
dF (w˜s, δ˜)
)
dG(w, δ) =
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
w=ws′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
w˜s<ws′′
dG(w˜s, δ˜)
)
dF (w, δ)
(35)
Consider now the limit as δ′ → δ′′ while B(δ′, δ′′) stays of positive measure (if it becomes of zero measure,
we can ignore it, wlog). The terms between brackets inside the integrals stay constant, and hence can be taken
outside the integrals. Dividing both sides by
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
w=ws′′
dF (w, δ), and taking the limit wrt δ, we have
(δ+λ1(1−F+(ws′′))
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
ws′=ws′′
dG(w, δ)
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
ws′=ws′′
dF (w, δ)
= (δ+λ1(1−F+(ws′′))l(ws′′, δ) = λ0u+λG−(ws′′),
where (1− F+(ws′′) = ∫w˜s>ws′′ dF (w˜s, δ˜) and G−(ws) = ∫w˜s<ws′′ dG(w˜s, δ˜). 
Proof of proposition 1 Suppose there exists equivalent wages wB, wA, such that wB > wA, and wB is
offered by the more risky firm while wA by the more solid firm. Then it must be that
(p− w∗(wB, δh))l(wB, δh) ≥ (p− w∗(wA, δl))l(wA, δh). (36)
Now, note the following, by (9) l(w
s,δl)
l(ws,δh)
= δh+λ1(1−F (w
s))
δl+λ1(1−F (ws)) > 1 and both right and left derivatives of this
ratio with respect to ws are λ1F
′
i (w
s)(δh−δl)
(δl+λ1(1−F (ws)))2 ≥ 0 with i = {L,R}. Therefore, this ratio is larger than 1 and
increasing, and in particular
l(wB, δl)
l(wA, δl)
≥ l(wB, δh)
l(wA, δh)
. (37)
To study the instantaneous profit per worker, notice
d
(
p−w∗(ws,δl)
p−w∗(ws,δh)
)
dws
=
−dw∗(ws,δl)dws (p− w∗ (ws, δh)) + dw
∗(ws,δh)
dws (p− w∗(ws, δl))
(p− w∗ (w, δh))2
> 0
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since p− w∗(ws, δl) > p− w∗(ws, δl) for ws > R0, and dw
∗(ws,δ)
dws is strictly increasing in δ for all w
s, all by
lemma 1. But this implies
p− w∗(wB, δl)
p− w∗(wA, δl) >
p− w∗(wB, δh)
p− w∗(wA, δh) . (38)
Now, putting (37) and (38) together, it follows that (36) implies
(p− w∗(wB, δl))l(wB, δl) > (p− w∗(wA, δl))l(wA, δl),
which contradicts that wA was the profit maximizing choice of the solid firm. 
Proof of proposition 2. First, the same argument that established thatG(ws, δ) is absolutely continuous with
respect to F (ws, δ) can be made to establish that F (ws, δ) is absolutely continuous with respect to G(ws, δ),
which then necessarily implies that each property (i)-(iii) applies to F (ws), if and only if it applies to G(w).
To establish property (ii), towards a contradiction, consider a ws at which a strictly positive mass of wages
is offered, with δ1 as the infimum of those types offering this equivalent wage. The expected profit gain for
this type when offering a wage ws + ε is greater than
dpi
dε
= −
(
dw∗(ws, δ)
dws
ε+ ξ(ε)
)
l(ws, δ1) + (p− w∗(ws, δ))λ1G
−(ws + ε)− λ1G−(ws)
λ1(1− F+(ws)) + δ1 , (39)
where ξ(ε) is a term with ξ(ε)ε → 0 as ε → 0. Note that a mass point at ws implies that, there exists a η > 0,
such that for all ε > 0, G−(ws + ε) − G−(ws) ≥ 2η(λ1+1)λ1 > 0. Then, as ε → 0, dpidε > η. Moreover, since
dw∗(ws,δ)
dws is continuous by (4), this also holds for a δ2 > δ1 close enough to δ1, in particular δ2 is also close
enough to δ1 to offer equivalent wage ws to workers. This δ2 then has a profitable deviation, which is the
contradiction we were looking for. This establishes the absence of mass points, and hence the continuity of
F (ws) and G(ws).
Next, consider the case where the support of F (ws) is not connected. Let ws be the minimum equivalent
wage in the support of F (ws), and w¯s the corresponding maximum wage. Then, there exist ws < ws1 < w
s
2 <
w¯s such that F (ws1) = F (w
s
2), and G(w
s
1) = G(w
s
2) by the continuity of F (w
s), G(ws). Consider a firm
posting at ws2, this firm can keep the same firm size but make strictly more profit when deviating to w
s. If
ws > R0, the same argument applies: the firm offering ws can deviate to R0, which does not affect his firm
size, but strictly raises the profit per worker. 
Proof of theorem 1 There are three steps in this proof. First, one can show that the equilibrium objects
F (ws), G(ws), w∗(w, δ), Fˆ (w|δ), R0 constructed fromw∗(z), ws(z) satisfy workers’ and firms’ optimization.
This is straightforward, with this and the derivation in the paper, we have established that a steady state
equilibrium corresponds to {ws(z), w∗(z), R0} and vice versa.24
Pseudoconcavity of the firm’s problem Secondly, we have to check that the first-order conditions indeed
pick the maximum in the firm’s problem, at any point where δ(z) is continuous. We can verify that the problem
24For completeness, this in appendix B.
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is pseudo-concave, using (4) and (17) by showing the expression below is negative when (18) holds.
d
dz′
(
(p− w∗(ws(z′), δ(z)))∂l
d(z′, δ(z))
∂z′
−
(
∂w∗(ws(z′), δ(z))
∂ws(z′)
dws(z′)
dz′
)
ld(z′, δ(z))
)
(40)
Evaluated at a point where the first order condition is equal to zero (z = z′), this has the same sign as
∂
∂z′
(
(p− w∗(ws(z′), δ(z))) 2λ1
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z)
)
− ∂
∂z′
(
∂w∗(ws(z′), δ(z))
∂ws(z′)
∂ws(z′)
∂z′
)
(41)
At a z = z′ the first term equals− 4λ21
(λ1(1−z)+δ(z))2 (p−w∗(ws(z), δ(z)))+
2λ21
(λ1(1−z)+δ(z))2 (p−w∗(ws(z), δ(z)))
which reduces to− 2λ21
(λ1(1−z)+δ(z))2 (p−w∗(ws(z), δ(z))). The second term equals
∂2w∗(ws,δ)
∂ws∂ws
(
dws
dz
)2
+∂w
∗
∂ws
d2ws
dzdz .
Focussing on the last term, differentiating (21) wrt z, we find that it equals
−dw
∗(z)
dz
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ + (p− w
∗(z))
2λ21
(λ1(1− z) + δ)2 +
(p− w∗) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1(δ − δ)
(r + δ + λ(1− z))2
dw∗(ws, δ)
dws
(42)
By (22), dw
∗(z)
dz < (p − w∗(z))
2λ21
(λ1(1−z)+δ) , and therefore in absolute value the first two terms of the expres-
sion above jointly are smaller than (p − w∗(z)) 2λ21
(λ1(1−z)+δ)2 . The last term in (42) is negative, and is equal
−∂2w∗(ws,δ)∂ws∂ws
(
dws
dz
)2
. Substituting the above in (40), and canceling out terms yields that ddz′
( ·) < 0.
Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point R0. Finally, we have to show existence and uniqueness of the
reservation wage R0 = ws(0) = w∗(0) satisfying (21), (22), (24). From this, the existence and uniqueness of
the steady state equilibrium then follows. Index dw
s(z;R0)
dz ,
dw∗(z;R0)
dz by their initial conditions R0; then (24)
is the solution to the following fixed point
R0 = T (R0), where T (R0) = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
1− z
r + λ1(1− z) + δ
dws(z;R0)
dz
dz (43)
Note that dw
s(z)
dz depends implicitly on the reservation only through (p− w∗(z)).
Manipulating (21) and (22), we can find
d(p− w∗(z))
dz
= −(p− w∗(z))
(
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) +
δ′(z)
δ(z)− δx(z)
)
(44)
dx(z)
dz
=
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
δ(z)− δ
r + λ1(1− z) + δ(z) +
(
δ′(z)
δ(z)− δ +
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
)
x(z) +
δ′(z)
δ(z)− δx(z)
2,
(45)
where x(z) = w
∗(z)−ws(z)
p−w∗(z) . Note that p − w∗(0) = p − R0, and x(0) = 0. Note that d(p−w
∗(z))
dR0
, by standard
FODE theory, is continuous in R0. Consider first the interval [0, z˜] on which δ(z) is continuous. On this
interval, x(z) does not depend on R0. We can rewrite (44) to get
d(p−w∗(z))
dz
(p− w∗(z)) = −
(
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) + δ
′(z)x(z)
)
; (46)
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Integrating over z yields
p− w∗(z) = e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
(p−R0), (47)
where the exponential term does not depend on R0. It follows immediately that
d(p− w∗(z))
dR0
= −e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
< 0.
To generalize this to general distributionsH(δ), consider next a point where δ(z) is discontinuous: this a point
where δ(z) drops discretely. We want to show that the properties of d(p−w
∗(z))
dR0
, dx(z)dR0 are preserved. Consider
first x(z), from (23),
(p− w∗(zˇ))x(zˇ) = δ(zˇ)− δ
limz↑zˇ δ(z)− δ
(
lim
z↑zˇ
(p− w∗(z))x(z)
)
. (48)
Alternatively, the limit limz↑zˇ y(z) = yL(z) for any variable y, and
δ(z)−δ
δL(z)−δ = ∆ we can rewrite (23) as
w∗ = ∆(w∗L(z)− ws(z))− ws(z) (49)
=⇒ (p− w∗(z)) = (p− w∗L(z))(1 + (1−∆)xL(z)). (50)
From the previous results then, given d(p−w
∗
L(z))
dR < 0,
dxL(z)
dR = 0 combined with (50), it follows that
d(p−w∗(z))
dR < 0; and thus,
d(p−w∗(z))
dR is preserved when δ(z) drops discretely.
Equation (50) tells us that d ln(p−w
∗(z))
dR =
d ln(p−w∗L(z))
dR +
d ln(1+(1−∆)xL(z))
dR . Rewriting (48) similarly,
using (50), we find
x(z) =
∆xL(z)
1 + (1−∆)xL(z) , (51)
from which it follows that dx(z)dR = 0 whenever
dxL(z)
dR = 0. Thus, the irresponsiveness of
dx(z)
dR is also
preserved whenever δ(z) drops discretely. Let Z = {ζi} be the countable set of ranks at which δ(z) drops
discretely; define additionally ζ0 = 0. Then, letting ζ¯(z) = sup{ζ ∈ Z|ζ < z}
p− w∗(z) = (p−R0)
 ∏
{i|ζi∈Z,ζi<z}
e
− ∫ ζiζi−1( 2λ1δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′) +δ′(z′)x(z′))dz′(1 + (1−∆(ζi))xL(ζi))
 ·
e
− ∫ zζ¯(z)( 2λ1δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′) +δ′(z′)x(z′)) (52)
From this it follows that d(p−w
∗(z))
dR0
= −S(z) < 0, where S(z) is the entire term postmultiplying (p−R0) on
the RHS of (52). It is negative and does not vary with R0. 25
25A similar result holds true in the standard Burdett and Mortensen model, where
p− w(z) = (p−R0)
(
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1 + δ
)2
,
however, here we have take care of the heterogeneity in δ, and the resulting influence on the wages (with wage cuts etc.). Notice that
if we set δ′(z) = 0 and hence ∆(z) = 0 and x(z) = 0 ∀z, the Burdett and Mortensen result in fact follows. We find it encouraging
that a similar nice property can be derived in our more complicated setting.
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To consider existence, note that T (p) = b, and for λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ 0 T (b) ≥ b, while T (R0) is continuous in
R0, as
dws(z;R0)
dz is continuous inR0, since, from the above, (p−w∗(z)) is continuous inR0. For 0 < λ0 < λ1,
because T (R0) = b + (λ0 − λ1)
∫
(V (w; δ) − V0)dF (w; δ) and
∫
(V (w; δ) − V0)dF (w; δ) is bounded by
p−b
r , and hence T (R0) is bounded from below by b − λ1 p−br , as we let R0 go negatively enough, eventually
T (R0) > R0.
To consider uniqueness, notice that the slope of T (R0) does not depends on R0. Hence, there can only be
at most one intersection with R0. (Since T (p) = b < p, we can rule out the case that T (R0) has slope 1, and
has a continuum of equilibrium). .
Proof of Result 1 The inflow into employment λ0u+ λG(z) = l(z)(δ(z) + λ(1− z)), the probability that
an inflow at time t survives until t + τ is e(δ(z)+λ1(1−z))τ ; thus the number of workers in the zth firm who
have been around τ periods teu(z, τ)
def
= l(z)(δ(z) + λ(1 − z)e−(δ(z)+λ(1−z))τ . Then, the derivative of the
empirical hazard rate with respect to tenure is
d ln
(∫ 1
0 δ(z)teu(z, τ)dz∫ 1
0 teu(z, τ)dz
)/
dτ = −
∫ 1
0
(δ(z)− δave)teu(z, τ) (δ(z) + λ1(1− z))dz∫
δaveteu(z′, τ)dz′
< 0 (53)
The derivative dteu(z, τ)/dτ = −teu(z, τ)(δ(z)+λ1(1−z)). Define δave
∫
teu(z
′, τ)dz′ =
∫
δ(z′)teu(z′, τ)dz′.
Then
∫ 1
0 (δ(z)− δave)teu(z, τ)dz equals zero; since δ(z)− δave and (δ + λ1(1− z)) are both decreasing, the
latter one strictly, the integral term in (53) is positive, establishing the result.
Proof of Result 2 By proposition 1, locally, for z close 0, we have w∗(z) strictly increasing. Then there
exists zˇ > 0 such that w∗(z) is strictly increasing for all 0 < z < zˇ, and by (21) so is ws(zˇ). Now, suppose
that there exists a sequence {zn} with zn < zˇ, such that w∗(zn)→ R0. By (3), then also ws(zn)→ R0. Then,
there exists an n, such that ws(zn) < ws(zˇ), contradicting the ranking property.
Proof of Result 3 Note that since dw∗(0)/dz > 0, at the the zˇ from which onwards an interval of wage cuts
occurs, both dw∗(zˇ)/dz = 0 and d2w∗(zˇ)/(dzdz) < 0, i.e. dw∗(z)/dz cuts 0 from above, at zˇ . The second
derivative at zˇ equals
d2w∗
dzdz
= −dw
∗
dz
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + (p− w
∗(z))
2λ1(λ1 − δ′(z))
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0)
+ δ′(z)
1
r + δ + λ1(1− z)
dws
dz
. (54)
Note that after substituting in dws(z)/dz from (21), the terms with δ′(z) cancel out. Evaluated at a point
where dw∗/dz = 0, and letting r → 0, this turns into
d2w∗
dzdz
∣∣∣∣
dw∗
dz
=0
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ
2
1
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0) (55)
This can be smaller than zero only if δ′′(z) < 0, which in turn occurs if and only if h′(δ) > 0, since δ′(z) =
−1/h(δ) and δ′′(z) = h′(δ)
h(δ)2
δ′(z).
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The second point follows from (22) being negative. Substituting in ws(z) into (22), a change of the
integrating variable (dz = −h(δ)dδ), this can be written equivalently as
(p− w∗(1−H(δ))) 2λ1
δ + λ1(1−H(δ)) <
1
h′(δ)
∫ δ¯
δ
2λ1(δ + λ1(1−H(δ˜)))
(δ˜ + λ(1−H(δ˜)))3 (p− w
∗(1−H(δ˜)))h(δ˜)dδ˜
Since p− w∗(δ(1−H(δ˜))) > p− w∗(δ) for δ˜ > δ, the above equation is negative whenever (26) holds.
Proof of Result 4 We can show this by establishing that d
2w∗(z˜)
dwdw < 0, and
dw∗(z˜)
dz = 0 cannot occur for
λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
.Note that the existence of wage cuts implies a z such that dw∗(z)/dz = 0, d
2w∗(z)
dzdz ≤ 0. This
implies that at that z, from (22) and (55),
(p− w∗(z)) 2(λ
n
1 )
2
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) < −δ
′′(z)
∫ z
0
1
δ(z′) + λ1(1− z′)
dws(z′)
dz′
dz (56)
(p− w∗(z)) 2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) = −δ
′(z)
∫ z
0
1
δ(z′) + λ1(1− z′)
dws(z′)
dz′
dz (57)
Dividing the RHS of (56) by the RHS of (56), and similarly for the LHS, this yields
λ1 < δ
′′(z)/δ′(z) =
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
as a necessary condition. Hence if λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
, we do not satisfy the necessary condition, and therefore can
rule out dw∗(z)/dz < 0 at z = 1−H(δ).
Proof of Result 5 is in the main text
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B Additional Material
proof of proposition 1, verification In the paper, we derived {ws(z), w∗(z), R0} satisfying (21), (22), (24)
from the equilibrium conditions. Here, we outline the reverse argument: any set {ws(z), w∗(z), R0} satis-
fying (21), (22) and (24) corresponds to a steady state equilibrium. Since we have established that the tuple
{ws(z), w∗(z), R0} satisfying the aforementioned conditions exists and is unique, we have also established
existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium.
The rest of proof consists of the rather straightforward construction of equilibrium. We construct (i) the ag-
gregate conditions, (ii) the worker’s optimization, (iii) firm’s optimization. First invert ω = ws(z), to construct
F (ω) = (ws)−1(ω), G(ws) = Gz(ws)−1(ω) at ws = ws(z), and w˜∗(ws, δ) for those wages that are actually
posted on the equilibrium path from w˜∗(w˜s, δ˜) = {w∗(z)|w˜s = ws(z), δ˜ = δ(z) for some z}. Then we
can construct Fˆ (w|δ) from F (ws), δ(z), w∗(ws, δ). F (ws, δ), G(ws, δ) can be constructed straightforwardly
from F (ws), δ(z). Now we have to show that these distribution are consistent with optimal decision making,
(ii)-(iii). Given F (ws), w˜∗(ws, δ), where for off-equilibrium (ws, δ) we use the same partial derivatives as in
lemma 1, to derive the entire function w∗(ws, δ). For worker optimization and firm optimization, consider that
firms choose ws in the profit maximization, which leads to the following first order condition
(p− w∗(ws(z), δ(z)))∂l(w
s, δ)
∂ws
−
(
∂w∗(ws, δ)
∂ws
)
l(ws, δ) = 0, (58)
which can be rewritten as
∂w∗(ws,δ)
∂ws
p− w∗(ws(z), δ(z)) −
∂l(ws,δ)
∂ws
l(ws, δ)
= 0, ⇐⇒
∂w∗(ws,δ)
∂ws
p− w∗(ws(z), δ(z)) =
2λ1F
′(ws)
δ + λ(1− F (ws)) (59)
Using F ′(ws) = 1/ws′(z), we can verify that (17) and (19) combined with (21) and (22) imply (4)-(5)
and the equivalence of (58) and (17), thus establishing both w˜∗(ws, δ) = w∗(ws, δ) and the optimality of
z = F−1(ws). Finally, the equivalence of R0 can be established by a simple change of variable in the integral
(24).
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